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Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information theoretic secure key as long as the device
performs as assumed in the theoretical model. One of the assumptions is an absence of informa-
tion leakage about individual photon detection outcomes of the receiver unit. Here we investigate
the information leakage from a QKD receiver due to photon emission caused by detection events
in single-photon detectors (backflash). We test commercial silicon avalanche photodiodes and a
photomultiplier tube, and find that the former emit backflashes. We study the spectral, timing
and polarization characteristics of these backflash photons. We experimentally demonstrate on a
free-space QKD receiver that an eavesdropper can distinguish which detector has clicked inside it,
and thus acquire secret information. A set of countermeasures both in theory and on the physical
devices are discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most
developed branches of quantum communications. QKD
offers protocol security in the sense that the QKD pro-
tocols [5, 6, 12] can be proven secure with a compos-
able security definition under the model assumptions
about Alice and Bob’s devices, but without assump-
tions about the adversaries capabilities [34, 36, 53, 58].
Nowadays, a large number of experimental systems are
available [1, 14, 32, 45, 48–50]. However, the issue of
implementation security is still a matter of concern as
the security proof of the protocols make model assump-
tions. By definition, there is a gap between the be-
haviour of actual devices and their model. This leads
to possible side channels exploitable by an eavesdropper
Eve [15, 19, 24, 29, 40, 42, 43, 51, 54–57, 60, 62, 63].
These side-channels may compromise the security of a
QKD implementation if they are not taken into account.
It is important to monitor potential side-channels and to
design countermeasures to minimize their impact. With
side-channels controlled in a best-practice approach,
QKD will then show an implementation security that se-
cures the generated key against future technological and
algorithmic advances. The protocol security proof is an
important component of that claim, even when the im-
plementation security claim is not a mathematical proof
in itself. Different aspects of QKD systems have been
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exploited, including but not limited to timing [65], infor-
mation leakage via Trojan-horse attack [16, 23, 55, 60],
pulse-energy-monitoring system [43, 57], device calibra-
tion [22], source flaws [64], laser seeding [59], and laser
damage [43]. However, most of the reported attacks ex-
ploited detectors [15, 19, 40, 42, 43, 54, 56], making them
the most vulnerable part of the system.
Among the exploitable vulnerabilities of the detectors
such as efficiency mismatch [42, 54, 65], detector con-
trol [15, 37–41, 56], and wavelength dependency [31],
one has attracted considerably less attention: the back-
flash emission [4, 9, 10, 13, 20, 28, 47, 61]. It has been
known for a long time [46] that a reverse biased p-n junc-
tions in a silicon avalanche photodiode in Geiger mode
emits light upon the detection of a photon. Chynoweth
and McKay [10] reported a detailed study of the phe-
nomenon and predicted that the light emission origi-
nates due to the recombination of the energetic elec-
trons and holes in the avalanche breakdown region. Sub-
sequently, several other papers stated distinct possible
causes for the phenomenon and quantified this emis-
sion [4, 9, 13, 20, 28, 47, 61]. In 2001, Kurtsiefer and
his coworkers [27] raised the question: can this emission
from the detectors employed in practical quantum com-
munication systems affect the security? The outcome of
their study suggested that the backflash photons might
leak information about the detection to Eve, though the
leakage of information was not quantified. Recently, a
study about the backflash in InGaAs/InP avalanche pho-
todiodes (APDs) was done [44]. The latter also suggests
the possibility that Eve could measure state of backflash
photons and learn about detection in the receiver without
causing errors in the key.
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2The quantum state of the backflash photons is not
expected to be correlated to that of the photon that
triggered the effect. However, and unfortunately from
a security point of view, the backflash photons may
pass through other security critical components of Bob’s
receiver and carry out information about the state of
those components back to the channel. For example,
in polarization-based QKD with a passive basis-choice
scheme, backflash photons from the horizontal (vertical)
detectors will come out into the channel horizontally (ver-
tically) polarized when they pass different arms of polar-
ization beam-splitters (PBSes). In this case, Eve can
measure the polarization of the backflash photons and
predict with high probability which detector they orig-
inated from, thus compromising the security. Another
possible method of distinguishing backflash photons from
different channels is monitoring the difference in time de-
lay of backflash photons from each channel. However, for
the device studied in this article, preliminary tests have
shown that the difference in time delay of backflash be-
tween channels is not sufficiently distinguishable to be
used to determine the source of backflash. Thus, we do
not investigate the latter method here.
The Article is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we
characterize backflash emission probability from APD
and photomultiplier tube (PMT) instead of InGaAs/InP
studied in Ref. [44]. Furthermore, in Sec. III, we char-
acterize backflash photons from a free-space polarization
encoding receiver, and use that information to demon-
strate a practical attack on the receiver. We also quan-
tify the information leakage to Eve in this attack scheme.
In Sec. IV, we introduce a countermeasure for this at-
tack that reduces reverse transmission efficiency of the
receiver from the detectors to channel to reduce informa-
tion leakage. We also introduce a characterization pro-
cedure and modify the key rate equation to take into
account the remaining information leakage. We conclude
in Sec. V.
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF BACKFLASH
EMISSION
In order to study the effect of backflash photon emis-
sion during the avalanche breakdown, a series of experi-
ments are conducted on two different types of detectors.
The first device tested is a Si-APD detector module (Ex-
celitas SPCM-AQRH-12-FC) with a circular active area
of 180 µm and peak photon detection efficiency of 0.7 at
700 nm [2]. The second device tested is a PMT (Hama-
matsu H7422P-40), which has a GaAsP photocathode,
with 5 mm diameter and a peak photon detection effi-
ciency of 0.4 at 580 nm [3]. Both are thermoelectrically
cooled.
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FIG. 1. Setup for measuring probability of backflash emission.
(a) Two identical APDs are connected with a 2 m long multi-
mode (MM) fiber causing 10 ns optical delay between the two
detectors. An electronic delay line of 40 ns is added so that
the backflash photons from SPCM could also be recorded. (b)
To perform spectral analysis, a free-space interference nar-
rowpass filter is added to the setup. The filter represents one
often used at the entrance of a practical QKD receiver.
A. Si avalanche photodiode
The first step in quantifying the information leakage is
to find the probability of backflash Pb, i.e., the probabil-
ity that a detection (click) leads to emission of at least
one photon that leaks out of the detector. To find the
value of Pb, we perform a measurement using the setup
in Fig. 1(a). Two identical APD modules, one marked as
device under test (DUT) and another marked as single-
photon counting module (SPCM), are connected by a 2 m
long 105 µm core diameter multimode fiber (Thorlabs
M43L01). Click coincidences between them are recorded
by a time interval analyzer (Stanford Research Systems
SR620). In this setup, we record clicks caused by dark
counts in the DUT. We record until the total clicks in
DUT reach N = 106, and plot the histograms of coin-
cidence clicks between the two detectors in Fig. 2. The
right-most peak represents the backflash photons from
DUT coupled through the fiber and detected by SPCM,
which occur ≈ 10 ns after the detections in DUT owing
to the optical delay. We have added a 40 ns electrical
delay so that the coincidence click appears at a delay of
≈ 50 ns in the plot. This also allows us to see the back-
flash from SPCM recorded by DUT, which is the left-
most peak having a similar shape but time-inversed. The
shape of the coincidence peak roughly matches that of the
current flowing through the APD IAPD, which we have
measured using a small resistor added at the APD’s cath-
ode and a wideband differential oscilloscope probe. We
divide the histogram into three regions. Region I shows
rapid increase in coincidence counts that resembles the
exponential increase of the number of avalanche electrons
flowing through the APD. Region II shows decay in the
coincidence counts resembling the decrease of avalanche
electrons owing to the voltage across the APD dropping
3as its capacitance discharges. Region III is where the
voltage across the APD is further lowered below break-
down by the quenching circuit. At that time the photon
emission drops to near zero. The rough match between
the current shape and the photon emission suggests that
the backflash photons originate from the electric current
across the APD during the avalanche.
We count coincident clicks C within the right-hand
peak. Here, we take into account channel transmission
efficiency T = 0.97, and average detection efficiency of
the SPCM in 500–900 nm spectral band η = 0.6 [2].
Since the SPCM can only detect photons efficiently in
this narrow spectral band, our measurement provides
only a lower bound estimate of Pb & C/(ηTN). We note
that this and subsequent calculations of backflash prob-
ability are approximate in the case where Pb  1. For
this specific setup, there are 37643 coincident detections,
corresponding to Pb & 0.065. Furthermore, we have mea-
sured the electrical charge flowing through the APD per
avalanche, by monitoring the current consumption from
the high-voltage bias source. We have found that the
APD under test passes on average ne− = 2.7× 108 elec-
trons through the APD per avalanche. The probabil-
ity of backflash photon emission per avalanche electron
Pe− & Pb/ne− = 2.4× 10−10. We remark that a detector
circuit that reduces ne− would be expected to have lower
backflash.
While the wideband measurement above is imprecise,
many free-space QKD setups employ a narrowband spec-
tral filter at Bob’s entrance, in order to cut background
light entering Bob [7, 8, 21, 25, 26]. The same filter
would restrict the backflash emission to the narrow band
that can be measured much more precisely in our setup.
We have added a free-space narrowpass filter with cen-
ter wavelength of 808 nm and bandwidth of 3 nm [see
Fig. 1(b)], in order to mimic spectral filter inside a prac-
tical QKD receiver [7]. We have repeated the count-
ing process and found 2306 coincident detections. At
this specific wavelength, the SPCM has detection effi-
ciency of 0.62 [2]. The coupling efficiency of the chan-
nel in this setup is T = 0.83. The probability of at
least one backflash photon leaking through this filter is
P filterb = 4.5 × 10−3. The spectral filter indeed reduces
the emission significantly, which reduces the information
leakage as we prove later in Sec. IV.
We have performed another measurement to charac-
terize the spectral distribution of the backflash photons,
using a sensitive spectrum analyzer (Acton Spectrapro
2750). Unfortunately, we could not fully calibrate the
spectrum analyzer for this specific setup, and the result
is only qualitative. The measurement indicates that the
backflash emission is broadband, spanning continuously
from 550 nm to >1000 nm with a gentle peak around
900 nm (see Appendix A). This broadband characteris-
tic leads to the possibility of including a narrow bandpass
spectral filter in the system. The filter limits the wave-
length range in which the backflash probability needs
to be characterised, reduces the backflash emission from
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FIG. 2. Histogram of time-intervals (dark grey) measured
from the coincident clicks from the setup in Fig. 1. The peak
on the right is backflash from DUT detected by SPCM. Re-
gions I, II, and III of the histogram represent different stages
of detector operation cycle. The shape of histogram resem-
bles the APD current IAPD (green line, measured separately).
The current shape is not exact owing to a finite common-
mode rejection ratio of the differential probe used to measure
IAPD. The apparent abrupt drop of current at the border
between regions II and III is common-mode interference from
the quenching circuit that lowers the bias voltage and thus
ends the avalanche. This coincides with a drop of photon
emission almost to zero. The peak on the left is backflash
from SPCM detected by DUT.
Bob, and thus reduces the information leakage.
B. Photomultiplier tube
Photomultiplier tube (PMT) is another type of detec-
tor widely used for its larger sensitive area and moderate
dark count rate [18]. We have replaced DUT in Fig. 1 (a)
with a PMT unit. Since the dark count rate of the PMT
is low, additional weak laser pulses have been coupled to
the active area of PMT to induce clicks. After record-
ing 106 counts in the PMT, we have found fewer than
100 coincidences for both the fiber and free-space setups.
This coincidence level is close to the dark count level of
the SPCM, implying that the probability of backflash in
PMT is negligible within the spectral range of our mea-
surement.
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FIG. 3. Receiver designed by INO working as a passive basis
choice polarization analyzer at 785 nm. Top: the important
optical components consists of a pinhole, coupling lens, beam-
splitter (BS), and polarizing beamsplitters (PBSes). Bottom:
photo of the receiver. Four multimode fibers lead to the four
detectors (not shown).
III. EAVESDROPPING EXPERIMENT
In this section, we experimentally quantify Eve’s abil-
ity to identify which detector the backflash photons orig-
inated from, by measuring the backflash photon’s polar-
ization state. Bob’s receiver used in this test is an inte-
grated receiver built by INO (National Optics Institute
of Canada) designed for a free-space passive polarization
encoding QKD system running at 785 nm. Fig. 3 shows
its optical scheme. The receiver consists of a pinhole to
prevent spatial mode attack [54], coupling lens to focus
incoming beam into optical fibers, and an integrated op-
tics module. The latter consists of a beamsplitter (BS)
to passively select the basis of measurement and PBSes
in each basis to discriminate the four polarizations of the
incoming photons: horizontal (H), vertical (V), diago-
nal (D), and antidiagonal (A). Next, we characterize the
backflash emission as a possible side channel.
A. Reverse loss and extinction ratio
As the photons back-propagate through the setup,
they experience the reverse loss of the receiver, i.e., the
loss from originating detector to the channel input. This
could reduce probability that backflash photon leaks into
the channel. The setup shown in Fig. 4 is used to esti-
mate this loss. An 808 nm laser (wavelength close to
the operating wavelength of the receiver) is connected
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FIG. 4. Setup for measurement of the reverse propagation
loss and polarization extinction ratio. An 808 nm laser is con-
nected to each of the output channels of the receiver, one at a
time. A 90:10 reflection:transmission (R:T) ratio beamsplit-
ter diverts the reverse propagating beam to the measurement
unit. The latter consists of a fiber-coupled optical power me-
ter, and a rotating PBS to measure power and polarization
extinction ratio of the reverse propagation beam. A polar-
ization controller PC is used to maximize throughput power
from each receiver channel.
TABLE I. Reverse propagating extinction ratio mea-
surement of Bob’s setup. The photons from H and V
channel could be distinguished with high probability.
The measured extinction ratios of A and D channels
are low, presumably owing to polarization becoming
elliptical at reflections in the measurement unit.
Output
channel
max min Extinction
ratioAngle
(deg)
Power
(µW)
Angle
(deg)
Power
(µW)
H 3 25.0 91 0.15 167
V 94 19.8 1 0.03 660
D 315 20.7 223 1.94 10.7
A 49 23.5 141 3.69 6.4
to the receiver’s output multimode fiber, one channel at
a time. The laser power at the end of receiver’s fiber is
P1 = 40 µW. We adjust the polarization controller PC to
maximize throughput power, providing an upper bound
of the reverse transmission. We then measure laser power
P2 emitted at the front of the receiver module, between
the focusing lens and receiver’s pinhole in 4. The reverse
transmission efficiency of the receiver for the optimum
polarization is then Tb = P2/P1. We have measured the
average reverse transmission efficiency over all four chan-
nels of this receiver Tb ≈ 0.091 (the individual values lie
in the range 0.088 to 0.094). Assuming backflash pho-
tons are randomly polarized, their transmission should
be approximately half of this upper bound.
Next, we demonstrate Eve’s ability to distinguish the
originating channel of backflash photon. For that, we
measure polarization extinction ratio of the reverse emit-
ted beam from the receiver. In Fig. 4, a 90:10 reflec-
tion:transmission (R:T) ratio beamsplitter is added to
divert the outgoing beam from the receiver to a mea-
surement unit consisting of a PBS and a fiber-coupled
optical power meter. This additional setup has through-
put efficiency Te = 0.60. For each receiver channel input,
5we rotate the PBS to find a pair of angles that results
in maximum and minimum power at the power meter.
The optimal angles for each channel and respective ex-
tinction ratios are shown in Table I. The drastically lower
extinction ratio in D and A polarization is likely a result
of polarization distortion caused by Fresnel effect on the
dielectric mirror and the 90:10 BS used by Eve. These
reflective surfaces were aligned at a certain angle along
the axis corresponding to V polarization. This alignment
distorted the diagonal polarization of the reflected beam,
by inducing a phase difference between its H and V po-
larization components. In real eavesdropping, Eve can
correct this polarization distortion using a phase com-
pensator or waveplate. She can also split the incoming
backflash photons into two PBSes oriented at the angles
that yield the highest extinction ratios in both bases.
This should allow her to distinguish the photons from all
four channels with high probability.
B. Timing of backflash photons through the
receiver
The previous experiment suggests that by measuring
the polarization of the backflash photons, Eve could es-
timate which detector they originated from. However, in
real life scenario, Eve’s detection might not solely be from
the backflash photons; it can be a result of stray light in
the channel, reflection of Alice’s signal from Bob’s op-
tical components or dark counts in Eve’s detector – all
unwanted noise. To avoid those unwanted signals, Eve
needs to synchronize her measurement apparatus with
Alice and Bob’s signal pulses, and activate her detector
at a specific time when the backflash photons are ex-
pected to arrive. The synchronization can be done by
monitoring Alice’s and Bob’s signals prior to the eaves-
dropping. This section demonstrates a practical setup to
measure timing characteristics of the backflash photons.
The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 5. A train
of 3 ns wide laser pulses with 200 ns period is sent to
Bob’s receiver to simulate signals from Alice. The detec-
tor used as DUT in Sec. II A is connected to one channel
of the receiver at a time. A time interval analyzer (TIA)
is used to record the coincidence time between the signal
sent by Alice and Eve’s SPCM clicks. In Fig. 6, we plot
two histograms of the coincidence time from the APD
in H channel. The green histogram is the coincidence
time when DUT is powered off. Thus the detections in
Eve resulted from reflections from the receiver’s optical
components. The positions of the peaks correspond to
optical delay between reflective components in the setup
and Eve’s SPCM. The leftmost peak is a result of backre-
flection off the free-space optics at the front of Bob, such
as his lenses and BS. The next peak matches the time
delay from fiber splices in the receiver’s fiber, indicated
by short bars in Fig. 5. The third peak is the backre-
flection from the APD (in H channel only, as the fiber
in the other channels has been terminated with match-
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FIG. 5. Eavesdropping setup for timing characterization and
proof-of-principle attack. The 90:10 R:T BS diverts photons
from Bob to Eve’s detector. Eve’s setup consists of a PBS that
can be rotated to find the optimal angle for Eve to distinguish
the source of backflash photon. The time interval analyser
(TIA) is used to find the time delay of the backflash photon
in the channel. The timetagging unit records coincidence time
between Bob’s and Eve’s detections in the proof-of-principle
attack.
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FIG. 6. Histogram of time intervals between emitting Alice’s
laser pulse and detection in Eve’s SPCM. The histogram with
DUT powered on (red) has an area of coincidence peak well
above the level when DUT is powered off (green). The timing
of this area matches the optical time delay between Eve’s
receiver and DUT, indicating backflash emission. The other
peaks are optical reflections in the setup (see text for details).
ing gel that eliminates backreflections). The time delay
of the right-most peak matches the round-trip of triple
reflection between the APD and fiber splice. The red
histogram is the coincidence time when DUT is powered
on. Extra counts due to backflash photons can clearly
be seen at 80–87 ns. The time delay matches optical de-
lay between DUT and Eve’s SPCM. Since the coincident
counts of backflash events are ≈ 1.5 orders of magnitude
higher than the back-reflection and noise level, the prob-
ability of Eve registering back-reflected pulses within this
time window is small. Similar result could be seen when
connecting the DUT to V, D, and A channels.
6C. Proof-of-principle eavesdropping demonstration
We next emphasize the threat of this attack by demon-
strating Eve’s performance using a practical setup, shown
in Fig. 5. In this experiment, we demonstrate Eve’s abil-
ity to distinguish backflash emissions in one basis, be-
tween H and V channels. We only consider those pho-
tons that are coupled back to the optical channel and thus
could carry information to Eve. We first repeat the align-
ment procedure as described in Sec. III A by sending laser
beam through the receiver’s fibers, and rotating the PBS
in Eve to find two optimal angles where the detection
rate from the laser sent through Bob’s H channel is max-
imum but V channel is minimum, and vise versa. Bob is
then equipped with four powered-on APDs, one at each
channel of the receiver, as in a real QKD setup. As seen
in Sec. III B, Eve needs to register the coincidence counts
within a specific time window to filter out back-reflection
events. For that, we replace TIA with a timetagger (Dot-
fast Consulting 78-ps resolution 8-channel module) set to
register the events where Eve’s detector clicks within 25–
30 ns after Bob’s detection, which matches the time delay
between Bob’s and Eve’s detectors. A train of 3 ns wide
laser pulses with 200 ns period are sent to Bob to simu-
late QKD signal pulses from Alice. For each orientation
of Eve’s PBS, we count the number of detections in Bob
and coincidence count in Eve over 10 s. We record the
ratio of coincidence events Rij = Eij/Bi, where Bi is
the number of clicks in Bob’s ith detector, and Eij is the
number of Eve’s coincident clicks with Bob’s ith detec-
tor when she sets her PBS angle to maximise clicks from
Bob’s channel j. For example, RHH represents proba-
bility of a click in Bob’s H channel causing a coincident
click while Eve aligns her PBS to measure signal from
H channel, i.e., the probability that Eve gets a correct
detection.
The probability of Eve gaining information (about H
channel detection) is the chance of getting correct de-
tection (RHH) less the chance that she gets a wrong
detection (RHV ). Note that the backflash probability
Pb and reverse transmission efficiency Tb are already ac-
counted in these coincidence ratios. Our measurements
show that, for Bob’s H detection, RHH = 5.00 × 10−3
and RHV = 1.45 × 10−3, causing information leakage of
3.5 × 10−3. For Bob’s V detection, RV V = 5.69 × 10−3
and RV H = 3.66 × 10−3, causing information leakage
of 2.0 × 10−3. From the calibration measurements we
have expected the information leakage to be less than
ηTeTbPb/2 = 1.1× 10−3, which poorly matches the leak-
age observed in the eavesdropping experiment. We could
not explain this discrepancy.
This result shows that Eve could learn a fraction of
Bob’s detections by monitoring the backflash photons.
On the one hand, the information leakage is small, and we
don’t have the spectral filter in Bob in this experiment.
On the other hand, our Eve’s setup is not an optimal one
for the attack. Proper countermeasures both in physical
implementation and in post-processing step need to be
considered.
IV. COUNTERMEASURE
In this section, we discuss about possible countermea-
sures for attacks exploiting backflash photons. For phys-
ical implementation, using PMT can eliminate the possi-
bility of generating backflash photons (although this con-
clusion is subject to the limitations of our measurement
in Sec. II B). Another possible countermeasure is us-
ing measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD)
[33, 35], in which the detection outcomes are public,
thus Eve gains no new information from the backflash.
However implementation of MDI-QKD in free-space is
challenging [11, 30, 52]. If a non-MDI-QKD system
uses APDs, the information leakage could be limited by
decreasing reverse transmission efficiency Tb either by
adding narrow-band spectral filter as shown in Sec. II,
or an optical isolator. These measures could reduce but
not eliminate the leakage of information. The remaining
leakage needs to be taken into account when calculating
the required shortening of the key during privacy ampli-
fication.
The following procedure could be employed. Bob fol-
lows the procedure in Sec. II A to find the APD’s proba-
bility of backflash Pb and receiver’s reverse transmission
efficiency Tb. This Tb includes all optical isolators and
filters added to the receiver to limit the information leak-
age. If Bob does not include a narrow-pass filter, these
parameters need to be characterized in a very wide spec-
tral range, because typical free-space optics and air are
transparent in a wide spectral band. This wide spec-
tral characterization will be challenging. However, if a
band-pass filter is used, it is sufficient to characterize the
parameters over its spectral pass-band. From the result
in Sec. III A, it is reasonable to assume that in the worst
case, with ideal equipment, Eve could distinguish the ori-
gin of backflash photons with certainty. The information
leakage to Eve is then PE = PbTb. In other words, a
fraction PE of Bob’s detections is tagged by Eve without
disturbing the quantum state or inducing error. Then the
privacy amplification for QKD with tagged signal [17, 36]
can be used to take care of the information leakage.
As an example, let us consider the key rate equation
for the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol in QKD
system with single-photon signals. Under the backflash
attack, the secret key rate per signal sent by Alice be-
comes
l ≥ APdet(1− h( e
A
))− leakEC , (1)
where Pdet is the probability of detection per signal, e
is the error rate, h(x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x) is
the binary Shannon entropy, and leakEC is the portion
of key disclosed during error correction. The correction
term A = (Pdet−PE)/Pdet, where PE is the information
leakage calculated in the characterization step above.
7The theoretical analysis in this paper considers only
the worst-case scenario where Eve has the ability to col-
lect and distinguish all backflash photons and map them
to the raw key in Alice and Bob. This analysis also pro-
vides only the lower bound on the secret key rate, which
could be improved by more careful analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
We have quantified the backflash emission of photons
from APD-based single-photon detectors, and verified
that these photons can be used by an eavesdropper to
learn about the key in QKD systems. We have found
that, for a system without spectral filter, at least 0.065
of the clicks in actively-quenched Si detector module re-
sult in backflash. This probability is reduced by a fac-
tor of 14 when a narrowband spectral filter is added,
suggesting the latter is an efficient countermeasure. For
PMT the backflash emission is negligible within the sen-
sitivity of our measurement. Our experiment with a real
polarization-encoding QKD receiver shows that Eve can
distinguish polarization of backflash photons with near
certainty. The proof-of-principle attack shows that Eve
could learn 2.0 × 10−3 fraction of raw key using our to-
day’s imperfect setup. The information leakage may be
higher for an ideal Eve. To close this loophole, we dis-
cuss a procedure to characterize the system and quan-
tify Eve’s information, then modify the key rate equation
to take care of the information leakage due to backflash
emission. We hope that our study will contribute to the
development of certification and standardization of prac-
tical QKD against side-channels.
Appendix A: Spectral distribution measurement
Figure 7 shows the spectral distribution of backflash
emission measured with a sensitive spectrum analyzer
(Acton Spectrapro 2750). Due to difficulties we have
encountered in spectrometer calibration, this measure-
ment has a large margin of error comparing with the
narrow-band filter measurement at a specific wavelength.
Thus, we omit this result from the main Article. Even so,
this measurement shows some important characteristics
of backflash emission. The backflash emission is broad-
band, spanning continuously across our range of mea-
surement from 550 to 1000 nm with a gentle peak around
900 nm. This suggest the possibility of having backflash
emission beyond our range of measurement. This em-
phasizes the necessity of adding the narrow-band filter
to ease the characterization process and limit the infor-
mation leakage.
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FIG. 7. Spectral distribution of backflash.
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